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We study zero-sum (combinatorial) games, within the framework of so-called Richman auctions (Lazarus et
al. 1996) namely, we modify the alternating play scoring ruleset Cumulative Subtraction (CS) (Cohensius et
al. 2019), to a discrete bidding scheme (similar to Develin and Payne 2010). Players bid to move and the
player with the highest bid wins the move, and hands over the winning bidding amount to the other player.
The new game is dubbed Bidding Cumulative Subtraction (BCS). In so-called unitary games, players remove
exactly one item out of a single heap of identical items, until the heap is empty, and their actions contribute
to a common score, which increases or decreases by one unit depending on whether the maximizing player
won the turn or not. We show that there is a unique bidding equilibrium for a much larger class of games,
that generalize standard scoring play in the literature. We prove that for all sufficiently large heap sizes, the
equilibrium outcomes of unitary BCS are eventually periodic, with period 2, and we show that the periodicity
appears at the latest for heaps of sizes quadratic in the total budget.
1 INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you are involved in a 2-player game, where the goal is to capture more objects than
your opponent, but at each stage of play, you may only remove one item. You may remove an object
if and only if you win a specially designed auction. Say that there are two objects in the heap (and
therefore to win the game you need to collect both, and if you collect one of them the game is
drawn), and assume that you and your opponent share $5; you have $1 and he has $4. In addition to
your single dollar, you have a tie-breaking marker, which works in your favor. If a player wins the
bid strictly, by bidding say d dollars, then they get an item but must pay the bidding amount to the
opponent. If the bid ends up equal, then the player with the tie breaking marker wins the round, gets
an item, but has to hand over $d and the marker to the other player. Clearly, you cannot win both
bids with a single dollar. The question is whether you will be able to tie this game, and win one of
the bids, or if the opponent can win both, and the answer is easy. Since the opponent has to bid $2 to
win the bid, then you will win the next round. (If you had only the marker but no dollar you would
lose both bids, and if you had only a dollar but no marker you would lose both bids.) From this
gentle introduction, we already have an intuition that the marker has a non-trivial impact on such
games, and it could be worth sometimes a dollar. The tie-breaking is necessary to play the game,
and to understand such games, it seems an unavoidable issue to resolve the worth of this ‘marker’ in
every game situation. We will formalize this ‘every’ setting and present some further major issues
to solve. But first, we provide some more background.
Richman auctions [14] are designed for any standard combinatorial 2-player game [1], to resolve
who is to play next. Instead of alternating play, for each stage of game, the 2 players, called Left
and Right,1 resolve this crucial moment by a type of auction where the winning player must pay the
losing player their bid amount.
Richman bidding can be adapted to any standard combinatorial game, and thus offers a way
to extend classical Combinatorial Game Theory (CGT) [1, 3, 17] to a more economic style of
gameplay. Moreover, Richman auctions are a perfect fit for combinatorial games, as they offer an
unlimited number of bidding rounds. This is useful, since many popular board games can be played
on arbitrarily large game boards, and various kinds of Nim-type removal games (a.k.a. heap games,
take-away games, etc) [1] can contain arbitrarily many objects in a starting position.
1These names are adapted from standard literature on combinatorial games, Left is ‘she’ and Right is ‘he’.
Urban Larsson, Neel Patel, and Ravi Kant Rai 2
In this paper, we study discrete bidding in a manner similar to [4]. We adapt the setting to a class
of games known as Cumulative Subtraction (CS) [2]. CS is played on a finite heap of pebbles, and
players take turns removing pebbles from the heap, but are only allowed to remove a number of
pebbles from a fixed set of values, called the subtraction set S ⊂ N. For example, if S = {3, 5, 9},
then players are allowed to remove either 3, 5 or 9 pebbles at each turn, as long as the heap size
stays non-negative. In the standard zero-sum variation, the final score is the difference between the
number of pebbles accumulated by each player by the end of the game. Player Left is the maximizer,
whereas player Right is the minimizer; the final score is the total number of pebbles collected by Left
during play minus Right’s total number. In order not to obscure the main ideas of our bidding setting,
we will simplify the ‘subtraction-part’ of the games, and focus on the simplest possible subtraction
set, namely when S = {1} (although several results hold also for more general subtraction sets).
Let N = {1, 2, . . .}, and let N0 = N ∪ {0}. Discrete bidding here means that there is a given
total budget of TB ∈ N0. One of the players has a budget p ∈ {0, . . . ,TB}, and the other player
has the budget q = TB − p. At each turn, players submit a (closed) bid. The player with the higher
bid gets to play, and pays their bid to the player with the lower bid. Thus, if player Left wins by
bidding ℓ, she pays this bid to Right, andmakes her desired move. The new budget partition becomes
(p − ℓ,q + ℓ). Ties are resolved using a tie-breaking marker: one of the players has the marker, and
this player wins the turn in case of equal bids. They makes their desired move, pays the other player
the bidding amount, and passes them the marker.
By adapting the bidding mechanism to CS, we get a new game, called Bidding Cumulative Sub-
traction (BCS).
The discrete setting gives new challenges and problems to Richman games. For example, the
marker, which is a necessary and convenient tool to resolve a tie, can sometimes be worth a dollar
(but not more).2 Perhaps this seems like an unfortunate side effect of the discrete setting, but it
turns out that it is quite interesting to resolve the accompanying asymmetry of the game. In many
situations, the player with the marker has a slight advantage, and it appears non-trivial to find out
exactly what that means, even in the case of the simplest subtraction set, S = {1}, which will also
be called the unitary setting.
1.1 Related Work
In the classical Richman setting [14] [13], the auction is continuous, say with total budget $1, and
the players split that budget to, say p and q, with p + q = 1. Optimal bids have been resolved for the
game TIC-TAC-TOE [4], but very little is known for the game of CHESS [12].
The main theorem of Richman games considers one additional setting, where the turn function
is a Bernoulli trial: for each stage of play, an r -biased coin is tossed to decide whose turn it is.
A player wins a given coin tossing game if and only if the player with budget $(1 − r ) wins the
corresponding Richman game. A rule to resolve ties is required, but since ties occur with probability
0, in the continuous setting, the main result holds for any standard tie breaking rule, with open or
sealed (simultaneous) bids. In games with zugzwangs (games where no player wants to move first),
it is customary to let the winner of a bid decide who is to play next. In games with a nonnegative
incentive (such as the gameswe will study), it suffices to have the players bidding for the opportunity
to take the next turn.
Develin and Payne [4] study win-loss games, with discrete Richman bidding, and they use a mod-
ified tie resolution method: the player with the marker may either keep the marker and let the other
player pay the bid and move in the game, or give away the marker together with the bid and make
2In the continuous setting, any positive bidding amount is worth more than the marker.
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their desired move in the game. This is not just a subtle difference in approach; namely, we empha-
size that our simpler approach has the benefit of generalizing alternating play. Namely, in our setting,
alternating play corresponds to TB = 0 (with both players having a respective individual budget of
0 as a result). Another obvious difference is that we study games with numeric results, in contrast
to the traditional CGT win-loss situation. This leads to an interesting question about uniqueness of
bidding equilibrium.
Combinatorial games are often viewed in the light of so-called normal play, where it is always
good to be able to move (an idea, which recently leads to an ‘absolute combinatorial game theory’
[9, 10]). Here, we may have a situation where the player who wins the bid is the normal play
loser. Thus, for our most general setting, we are motivated to include a certain penalty function,
τ , with input Left and Right terminal positions. If a player wins a bid that has no move, there is
some consequence of this final auction; indeed in Guaranteed Scoring games [8, 11] a ‘terminal
penalty’ is invoked for a player who cannot move (and this penalty corresponds to the maximum
score that the other player can still achieve by playing out all remaining move options). We include
this short discussion here, since we want to emphasize that the proposed move convention in this
work generalizes game settings in the literature.
All literature on combinatorial games assumes a unique equilibrium, which defines a game value
under optimal play; see for example [5–8, 11, 16, 17].
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we first analyze a general setting of discrete Richman bidding adapted for any standard
combinatorial scoring game.We show that if the ruleset satisfies some basic and intuitive monotonic-
ity properties, then each such game exhibits a unique equilibrium. Then in the rest of the paper, we
focus on a simple class of Bidding Cumulative Games (defined in Section 3) named unitary games.
Our theoretical contribution can be summarized in three main results.
In Section 3.1, we show that every unitary game has a unique equilibrium described recursively
by maximin functions of the game positions (Theorem 13). We prove this result by showing that the
ruleset of unitary games satisfies sufficient properties for uniqueness. Then we prove further mono-
tonicity properties of unitary games, which helps us to prove a convergence result. In Section 3.3,
we prove that the equilibrium outcomes of unitary games converge for heap sizes of the same parity,
i.e. the sequence is eventually periodic with period 2 (Theorem 25). Moreover, aided by a certain
‘bidding automaton’, in Section 3.4, we show that the convergence to this periodicity is quadratic in
the size of the total budget (Theorem 28). In addition, we provide a conjecture on the corresponding
closed formula expression for the equilibrium outcomes in the limit (Conjecture 29).
2 EQUILIBRIUM PROPERTIES
Let us first elaborate on the fundamental properties of discrete Richman bidding, for any combi-
natorial scoring (zero-sum) game. For a given total budget TB ∈ N0, let TB = p + q, where p is
Left’s part of the budget, and unless otherwise stated, Left has the tie-breaking marker. Moreover,
let ∅ , B ⊆ {0, . . . TB}, be the set of possible Richman bids.3 A player may not be able to bid on
their turn; for example, if 0 < B and the player’s budget has been exhausted. In this case, the player
who is able to place a bid moves and transfers a valid bid amount b ∈ B to the other player. In case
there is a position such that no player can bid, the ruleset is invalid. We will assume valid rulesets,
i.e. some player is able to place a bid at every turn.
In this section, we consider acyclic combinatorial rulesets of the form Γ = (X ,L,R,B), where X
is a set of positions (nodes), and L,R : X → 2X are the move functions for players Left and Right
3We let the bidding set be symmetric to simplify notation.
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respectively, with discrete Richman B-bidding, and with given weight functionswL,wR : X ×X →
R on the set of move edges, for each player. Here X denotes a possibly infinite set of ‘starting’
positions, in a usual sense of CGT: any game state may be considered as a starting position, but
each play sequence is finite. A Left move is of the form x ∈ X → y ∈ L(x), and similarly for Right.
The final score (or utility) of a terminating play sequence σ is
u(σ ) = τ (t) +
∑
wL(eL) −wR (eR ),
where Left played the moves eL and Right played the moves eR . The weighted move edges are
chosen at each stage of play by the winner of the Richman bidding. The terminal penalty scores are
given by a function τ : TL ∪TR → R, whereTL,TR ⊂ X is the set of terminal positions for Left and
Right respectively. The game ends when the player who wins the Richman bidding cannot move.
Throughout the paper, given a total budget TB, for a given position x ∈ X , a Richman-position is
denoted by (x , p̂), where Left has p dollars and the tie-break marker, or by (x ,p), where Left has p
dollars but Right has the marker. A note on terminology: we will abbreviate ‘Richman-position’ to
position, since the generalized CGT ‘move-flag’, the current budget partition (sometimes denoted
simply by p̂ or p), is mandatory information to play.4
A player may have move options, but not being able to access them even if the other player does
not have any move options. For example, if Left has no remaining budget, and Right has the marker,
then if Left is the only player with move options, the game will end, because Right will win that bid.
Combinatorial games are often viewed in the light of so-called normal play, where it is always good
to be able to move. Here, we may have a situation where the player who wins the bid is the normal
play loser.
This is the motivation for the penalty function, τ ; if a player wins a bid that has no move, there is
some consequence of this final auction.
For symmetric games, where L = R and wL = wR , this discussion is obsolete, and we may set
τ (t) = 0, for all terminal positions t . In the symmetric case, there is no bidding when one of the
players runs out of options, because then both players run out of options, and there is no possibility
that the game may continue.
Our games generalize standard combinatorial scoring games; namely, by taking TB = 0, we
obtain the standard alternating play mechanics. As mentioned, combinatorial games have unique
equilibria, which defines game values under optimal play, and depending on who starts the game.
We will demonstrate that we do have uniqueness of equilibrium in our generalization, under a natural
set of axioms. In those cases, we may refer to unique game values.
Let us first define the relevant maximin functions. The maximin function induces a bid-action
pair that offers the greatest value of a set of minima: Left declares bids and notes Right’s bid-action
responses in each case. Then Left chooses the bid that maximizes the value, and given that Left can
choose action if she wins the bid. Minimax is the reverse situation.
DEFINITION 1 (MAXIMIN FUNCTIONS). Consider a a total budget TB ∈ N0 and a ruleset
(X ,L,R,B). The maximin functions ν̂ ,ν : X → RTB+1 are defined on positions (x , p̂) and (x ,p),
respectively.
For all p ∈ {0, . . . ,TB}, for terminal positions tL, tR ∈ X , ν̂p (tL) = τ (tL), νp(tR ) = τ (tR ), and
recursively, for non-terminal positions x ∈ X ,
ν̂p(x) = max
ℓ,y∈L(x )
min
r ,z∈R(x )
{ν̂p−ℓ(y)|ℓ>r +wL(x ,y),νp−ℓ(y)|ℓ=r +wL(x ,y), ν̂p+r (z)|ℓ<r +wR (x , z)}
4This is consistent with standard CGT terminology, which often omits the notion of who is to move, since the theory requires
analysis of all players as starting players.
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and
νp (x) = max
ℓ,y∈L(x )
min
r ,z∈R(x )
{νp−ℓ(y)|ℓ>r +wL(x ,y), ν̂p+r (z)|ℓ=r +wR (x , z),νp+r (z)|ℓ<r +wR (x , z)},
where ℓ ∈ B ∩ {0, . . . ,p} and r ∈ B ∩ {0, . . . ,q}.
The minimax functions are defined analogously.
The classical ‘CGT outcome’ in alternating play from position x corresponds to TB = 0, and it is
the ordered pair o(x) = (ν̂0(x),ν0(x)), the optimal play score when Left and Right starts, respectively.
Note that, since the bidding is trivial, for this case, there is a unique equilibrium. In general, if, for
all positions x , each entry has a unique equilibrium, the generalized CGT-outcome, for TB ∈ N,
is the vector o(x) = (ν̂TB(x), . . . , ν̂0(x),ν0(x), . . . ,νTB(x)). Whenever applicable, we call this vector
o(x) the (optimal play) outcome of x . For symmetric games, i.e. when the move sets L = R are
the same, it suffices to store half this vector, and so we drop the marker notation, and write o(x) =
(ν̂TB(x), . . . , ν̂0(x)) (i.e. symmetric outcomes assume that Left has the marker).
In Definition 2, we provide intuitive properties of the ruleset Γ and we prove that the following
properties suffice to establish uniqueness of equilibria in Theorem 3.
DEFINITION 2 (UNIQUENESS PROPERTIES). A ruleset Γ ∈ U if the pair of maximin functions
(ν̂ , ν ) satisfies, for each position x , for all p ∈ {0, . . . ,TB}:
(A) ‘Budget Monotonicity.’ ν̂p (x) ≥ ν̂π (x) and νp (x) ≥ νπ (x), if p > π .
(B) ‘Marker Monotonicity.’ ν̂p(x) ≥ νp (x).
(C) ‘Marker Worth.’ ν̂p (x) ≤ νp+1(x).
If a ruleset Γ ∈ U, then, by (A) the players weakly prefer to win by smaller bids, by (B) Right
weakly prefers to tie a Left winning bid, and by (C), given a Right bid, Left weakly prefers to tie
before winning strictly (the marker is worth at most a dollar). These properties are fairly straight
forward and intuitive in our setting. We now show in Theorem 3 that if ruleset Γ satisfies such
properties, then it exhibits unique equilibria.
THEOREM 3 (UNIQUENESS). If a ruleset Γ ∈ U, then for all positions and for all budget parti-
tions, the game has a unique equilibrium.
PROOF. We assume with no loss of generality that Left has the marker: a symmetric argument
holds when Right has the marker.
Suppose that Left bids ‘0’. Then, if Right benefits by deviating, by (A) and the zero-sum property,
we may assume that he bids ‘1’ (perhaps he bids more if the same value). Suppose next that Left
bids 1. Then similarly Right might benefit by bidding 2, and so on.
Item (C) implies that Left does not benefit by winning strictly at bid ℓ, if she can win by a tie at
bid ℓ − 1. Item (B) implies that Left does not prefer a Right tie at a given Left bid. By combining
these two statements, Left weakly prefers a tie bid at ℓ ≥ 0, before any larger tie.
Altogether, this deviation scheme must terminate at some tie bid ℓ ≤ p or possibly Right wins at
ℓ + 1 ≤ q, and in either case the unique equilibrium is given by Definition 1. 
For the special case of symmetric games, we simplify the notations, and denote L = R = M.
In Observation 4, we define maximin function for symmetric games which is a special case of the
maximin function defined in the Definition 1.
PROPOSITION 4 (SYMMETRIC MAXIMIN). Consider a symetric ruleset. For all terminal posi-
tions t ∈ X , for all p, ν̂p (t) = νp (t) = 0. For non-terminal x ,
ν̂p (x) = max
0≤ℓ≤p,y∈M(x )
min
0≤r ≤q,y∈M(x )
{ν̂p−ℓ(y)|ℓ>r+w(x ,y),νp−ℓ(y)|ℓ=r+w(x ,y), ν̂p+r (y)|ℓ<r−w(x ,y)},
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where, for all x , p,
νp(x) = −ν̂q(x). (1)
PROOF. We express the equality (1) as
νp(x) = −ν̂q(x)
= − max
0≤ℓ≤q
min
0≤r ≤p
{ν̂q−ℓ(y)|ℓ>r +w,νq−ℓ(y)|ℓ=r +w, ν̂q+r (y)|ℓ<r −w}
= − max
0≤ℓ≤q
min
0≤r ≤p
{−νp+ℓ(y)|ℓ>r +w,−ν̂p+ℓ(y)|ℓ=r +w,−νp−r (y)|ℓ<r −w}
= max
0≤ℓ≤q
min
0≤r ≤p
{νp+r (y)|r>ℓ +w, ν̂p+r (y)|ℓ=r +w,νp−ℓ(y)|r<ℓ −w}
where, at each instance, y ∈ M(x), and where the middle equality is by (1). Since the maximin
is now applied on the negative maximin values, we must swap the players inside the brackets, and
hence the last equality follows when we remove the signs. This coincides with Definition 1, when-
ever L = R =M. 
And even simpler, by the restriction to symmetric games, and in view of (1), we may leave out
the function ν .
OBSERVATION 5 (SIMPLIFIED MAXIMIN). The tuple of maximin functions ν̂ : X × {0, 1} →
R
TB+1 is, for all p ∈ {0, . . . ,TB}, if t ∈ X is terminal, ν̂p (t) = 0, and, for non-terminal x , given
ℓ, r ∈ B,
ν̂p (x) = max
0≤ℓ≤p,y∈M(x )
min
0≤r ≤q,y∈M(x )
{ν̂p−ℓ(y)|ℓ>r+w(x ,y),−ν̂q+ℓ(x)|ℓ=r+w(x ,y), ν̂p+r (y)|ℓ<r−w(x ,y)}.
If a ruleset satisfies the uniqueness properties, by the proof of Theorem 3, we may simplify
the maximin function a bit further. For example, if the game is symmetric, we get the following
convenient simplification of Observation 5. In Corollary 6, we show a simpler form of maximin
function for symmetric games whenever ruleset Γ ∈ U.
COROLLARY 6. If the ruleset Γ ∈ U is symmetric, then for all non-terminal game positions and
for all budget partitions, the unique equilibrium value is given by: for all p ∈ {0, . . . ,TB}, if t ∈ X
is terminal, ν̂p (t) = 0, and, for non-terminal x , given ℓ, r ∈ B,
ν̂p(x) = max
0≤ℓ≤p,y∈M(x )
min
0≤r ≤q,z∈M(x )
{−ν̂q+ℓ(y)|ℓ=r +w(x ,y), ν̂p+r (z)|ℓ<r ≤q −w(x , z)}. (2)
PROOF. This follows by combining Observation 5 with Theorem 3, since given any Right bid, by
(C), Left prefers a tie, before winning strictly. 
This simplifies the analysis of equilibrium, because if a ruleset satisfies U then the cases where
Left wins strictly need not be considered because Right always prefers to tie a Left winning bid. In
general, we have the following conjecture.
CONJECTURE 7. Consider a ruleset Γ. If all weights are nonnegative for Left and all weights
nonpositive for Right, and 0 ∈ B, then Γ ∈ U .
Moreover, in the following examples, we show that if a ruleset has negative Left-weights and/or
positive Right-weights, then there exist zugzwang games for which propertyU does not hold. How-
ever, when 0 ∈ B, we have not found any game that violates propertyU(A) orU(C).
Example 2.1. Consider a ruleset Γ, where X = {x1, x2}, R(x1) = {x2}, R(x1) = L(x1) = L(x2) =
∅ and 0 ∈ B. Suppose thatwR (x1, x2) = 1, and τ (x2) = 0, i.e. there is no penalty for not being able
to move from the terminal position x2. If the current score c(x1) = 0 and Right has the marker but
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no budget, then if Left bids 0 at position x1, Right must move to the terminal position x2, and the
game ends at the final score c(x2) = 1, which is good for Left. If Right does not have the marker
(independently of the budget partition), he is better off, because he will bid 0, and the game will end
at c(x1) = 0 (if there were a penalty at this terminal that would have been a Left penalty, but Right
would not have been able to take benefit). Thus, 0 = ν̂1(x1) < ν1(x1) = 1, and propertyU(B) is not
satisfied.
Example 2.2. Suppose that 0 < B, and otherwise with Γ as in Example 2.1. Analogously, a player
does not want to have any budget, and thus U(A) may not hold. Similarly, one can see that the
marker can be worth more than a dollar; if TB = 1 and you have the marker but not the dollar, then
if you exchange the marker for the dollar, you are worse off. Hence U(C) may not be satisfied if
0 < B.
3 BIDDING CUMULATIVE SUBTRACTION
In this section, games are symmetric, i.e. the move options are the same for both players; see [2]
for the motivation on similar alternating play games. We now define the ruleset Bidding Cumulative
Subtraction.
DEFINITION 8 (BIDDING CUMULATIVE SUBTRACTION, BCS). There is a subtraction set S ⊂
N, a total budget TB ∈ N0, a bidding set B ⊂ {0, . . . TB}, and a heap of finitely many, x ∈ N0,
objects (pebbles). There are two players, Left and Right, who take turns removing objects from the
heap. The total budget TB ∈ N0 (a game constant) is partitioned between the players, as (p,q), with
p + q = TB. Exactly one of the players has a tie-break marker m ∈ {0, 1}, where m = 1 if Left
has the marker. A complete game configuration is of the form (S,B; x ,p,m, c), where c ∈ Z is the
current score. If Left has the marker and c = 0, we abbreviate a position by (x , p̂), and otherwise,
when Right has the marker, we write (x ,p). At each stage of play, the players (make closed) bid of
who is to take an action, Left bids ℓ and Right bids r . The player with the highest bid wins the move.
If the bids are equal, the player with the marker wins the move. The winning bidder transfers the
bidding amount (together with the marker in case of a tie) to the other player. If Left has the marker,
a typical bid is (ℓ̂, r ). A player who wins the bid acts by collecting s ∈ S objects, which adds s to a
current score c, if Left wins the bid, and otherwise, it subtracts s. The game ends when the number
of objects in the heap is smaller than min S . Left seeks to maximize the final score (utility) whereas
Right seeks to minimize it. A removal of s ∈ S , in case Left has the marker, is of one of the forms:
• (TB; x ,p, 1; c) → (TB; x − s,p − ℓ, 1; c + s), s ∈ S , if Left bids ℓ ≤ p and wins a non-tie.
• (TB; x ,p, 1; c) → (TB; x − s,p − ℓ, 0; c + s), s ∈ S , if Left bids ℓ ≤ p and wins a tie.
• (TB; x ,p, 1; c) → (TB; x − s,p + r , 1; c − s), s ∈ S , if Right wins by bidding r ≤ q.
In view of Section 2, we have the ruleset Γ = (N0,M), where , for all x ≥ min S ,M(x) = {x−s ≥
0 | s ∈ S}. In rest of this section, we focus on unitary games, which is a BCS with subtraction set
S = {1}. We illustrate bidding in such games in Section 5.
3.1 Unitary Games
If S = {1} and B = {0, . . . ,TB}, we call BCS unitary. In this section, we prove that for each
heap size and each budget partition, there is a unique equilibrium outcome, given by the maximin
function (Theorem 3). That is, by using the notation in Section 2, we prove that the symmetric
ruleset Γ = (N0,M) ∈ U, if for all x ∈ N,M(x) = {x − 1}. In the spirit of Definition 8, for unitary
games, we write (TB; x ,p,m; c) := ({1}, {0, . . . ,TB}; x ,p,m; c). Unitary games simplify quite a lot
and allows us to prove simple properties on the bound game values, uniqueness of equilibrium and
convergence bounds. We start with a simple result in Lemma 9.
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LEMMA 9 (PARITY). For unitary games, the utility of any sequence of play from a heap is odd
if and only if the size of the heap is odd.
PROOF. For an odd heap size x , if we divide the total wins between Left and Right, it has to be
even for one player and odd for the other. If x is even, the number of wins for the players will either
both be even or both will be odd. Thus, the difference is even. 
Since unitary games are symmetric, we may assume that Left has the marker, unless otherwise
stated, som = 1 will be the default. We define maximin function for unitary games in Defination 10
which is a special case of Observation 5.
DEFINITION 10 (UNITARY MAXIMIN). The maximin function ν̂ : X × {0, 1} → RTB+1 is, for all
p ∈ {0, . . . ,TB}, ν̂p (0) = 0, and for x > 0,
ν̂p(x) = max
0≤ℓ≤p
min
0≤r ≤q
{ν̂p−ℓ(x − 1)|ℓ>r + 1,−ν̂q+ℓ(x − 1)|ℓ=r + 1, ν̂p+r (x − 1)|ℓ<r − 1}.
We are now ready to prove the first main result of the paper in Theorem 13, which establishes the
unique equilibrium in unitary games. However, before proving Theorem 13, we show the following
examples to motivate the result, Theorem 13, by maximin play in simple unitary games. Let us first
revisit the example in the first paragraph, in a more formal manner.
EXAMPLE 11 (MAXIMIN PLAY). Let us illustrate Definition 10 with an example where TB = 5,
and x = 2, displaying the values op (x) for TB = 5 and the heap sizes x = 0, 1, 2. We explain the
entry with the question mark in the table. If the position is (2, 1̂), then ℓ ∈ {0, 1} and r ∈ {0, 1, 2}, by
x \ p̂ 5 4 3 2 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1
2 2 2 0 0 ‘?’ -2
the reduced form equivalent. If ℓ = 0, then Rights minimum is min{−ν̂4+0(1) + 1, ν̂1+1(1) − 1} = −2.
If ℓ = 1, then Right’s minimum is min{ν̂1−1(1)+ 1,ν1−1(1)+ 1, ν̂1+2(1) − 1} = min{ν̂0(1)+ 1,−ν̂5(1)+
1, ν̂3(1) − 1} = 0. Hence, Left will bid ℓ = 1 and ν̂1(2) = max{−2, 0} = 0.
EXAMPLE 12. Consider TB = 9. We computed maximin values for heap sizes x ≤ 8, and gain
the following bidding tables for heap size x = 9. Left bids ℓ and Right bids r . The lower right
corners show the equilibrium values, i.e. the maximin = minimax value; see Theorem 3. Note that
everything to the right of the bold is smaller than or equal the diagonal in bold, but by the second
table, the bold does not bound the below area (as in the proof of Theorem 3).
r \ ℓ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 max
0 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -3 1
1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -3 1
2 3 3 1 1 -1 -1 -3 3
3 3 3 3 -1 -1 -1 -3 3
min 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -3 1
r \ ℓ 0 1 2 3 4 max
0 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1
1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1
2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
3 1 1 1 -1 -1 1
4 1 1 1 1 -3 1
5 3 3 3 3 3 3
min -1 -1 -1 -1 -3 -1
For unitary games, we aim to prove
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THEOREM 13 (EQUILIBRIUM FOR UNITARY GAMES). If BCS is unitary, then for all positions,
it has a unique equilibrium. It is given by, for all p, op (0) = 0, and if x > 0, then
op (x) = max
0≤ℓ≤p
min
0≤r ≤q
{−oq+ℓ(x − 1)|ℓ=r + 1,op+r (x − 1)|ℓ<r ≤q − 1}. (3)
As demonstrated by Corollary 6, the proof of the theorem will follow, by establishing the prop-
erties in Definition 2 for unitary games. In Section 3.2, we prove the properties in Definition 2 for
unitary games.
After this, in Section 3.3, we prove a certain monotonicity result on increasing heap sizes (Lemma 24).
This will lead to the second main result of this paper, an eventual period 2 of equilibrium outcomes
in case of unitary games.
In Figures 1 and 2, we show the equilibrium outcomes for all sufficiently large heap sizes for the
special cases of TB = 8 and 9 respectively. This eventual stabilization of the outcomes and bids is
later formalized via an independent bidding automaton, and we conjecture that these are generic
examples.
“−”
(x , 8̂) (x , 7̂) (x , 6̂) (x , 5̂) (x , 4̂) (x , 3̂) (x , 2̂) (x , 1̂) (x , 0̂)
x even
+5 +3 +3 +1 +1 −1 −1 −3 −3x odd
+4 +4 +2 +2 0 0 −2 −2 −4
Fig. 1. The value table for TB = 8 and sufficiently large heap sizes x, even and odd respectively. The
blue arrow indicates a shift of sign in the representation of (x, 8̂) → (x − 1, 8), x odd; that is, both
players bid 0, and Left wins the bid by tie-breaking. This bidding is equilibrium play, since 5 = 1−(−4).
(x , 9̂) (x , 8̂) (x , 7̂) (x , 6̂) (x , 5̂) (x , 4̂) (x , 3̂) (x , 2̂) (x , 1̂) (x , 0̂)
x even
+5 +5 +3 +3 +1 −1 −1 −3 −3 −5x odd
+6 +4 +4 +2 +2 0 −2 −2 −4 −4
Fig. 2. The value table for TB = 9 and sufficiently large heap sizes x, even and odd respectively. The
arrow indicates a Left win by the bid ℓ = 3, from (x, 9̂), on a large even heap size x. This bid is not
in equilibrium. In fact, the bid is dominated by Left bidding 1, which is in equilibrium, since 5 + 1 = 6.
Note also that bidding zero is in equilibrium. Indeed 0-ties are in equilibrium for all sufficiently large
heap sizes.
3.2 Property U for Unitary Games
We begin by proving monotonicity of maximin values for fixed heap sizes, i.e. property U(A),
‘budget monotonicity’ in Lemma 14.
LEMMA 14 (BUDGET MONOTONICITY, U(A)). For all games, ν̂p (x) ≥ ν̂π (x) if p ≥ π .
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PROOF. The proof is by induction over the heap sizes, and note that νp (0, 1) = 0 ≥ 0 = νπ (0, 1).
Suppose that the statement holds for all heap sizes smaller than x > 0. In row x , Left has all the
bidding options with budget p as she has with budget π . Since, by induction, the values are non-
decreasing in row x − 1, if she can force a win (perhaps using a tie) with budget π , she is assured at
least as good value in column p as in column π . If she cannot force a win with budget π , the only
difference is that with budget p she could perhaps force a win, and again, the budget monotonicity
of the smaller heaps imply the result. 
REMARK 15. By combining (1) with Lemma 14, we get νp (x) ≥ νπ (x) if p ≥ π .
Thus, by combining Lemma 14 and Remark 15, we show that unitary games satisfies Defini-
tion 2 (A) property. However, we have some direct consequences of budget monotonicity. We
may condition maximin values on given bids. If the players tie ℓ from position (x , p̂), we write
ν̂p (x)|T (ℓ) = −ν̂q+ℓ(x − 1) + 1, and so on, for the result, given an ℓ-tie at
(
x , p̂
)
and subsequent
maximin play.
In Lemma 16 prove the tie monotonicity property of for unitary games which shows that Left
weakly prefers the tie (ℓ − 1, ℓ − 1) over (ℓ̂, ℓ). This property will be useful to prove that unitary
games satisfiesU(B) property.
LEMMA 16 (TIE MONOTONICITY). At any position, with x ,p, ℓ > 0, the tie (ℓ̂, ℓ) is maximin
weakly worse for player Left, than the tie (ℓ − 1, ℓ − 1).
PROOF. The proof follows by heap monotonicity (Lemma 14). In particular, we have ν̂q+ℓ(x) ≥
ν̂q+ℓ−1(x). On the other hand ν̂p (x)|T (ℓ) = 1− ν̂q+ℓ(x −1) and ν̂p (x)|T (ℓ−1) = 1− ν̂q+ℓ−1(x −1). Hence,
ν̂p (x)|T (ℓ) ≤ ν̂p (x)|T (ℓ−1). 
This innocent consequence of heap monotonicity implies that Right can assure the outcome of
the 0-tie, namely all entries in the upper right area weakly bounded by the main diagonal (in the
game value matrix described in Example 12), are weakly smaller than the value at the 0-tie. (This
property is implicit in the proof of Theorem 3.)
In the next Lemma 17, we prove a natural bounds on game value of the equilibrium outcomes
when Left has marker in term of the game value at equilibrium when Left does not have a marker.
This result precisely prove that unitary games satisfies Definition 2 (B). As a bonus, we get a bound
on how good the marker can be.
LEMMA 17 (MARKER MONOTONICITY, U(B)). Consider any unitary ruleset. Then, for all
heap sizes x and all Left budgets p,
νp (x) ≤ ν̂p (x) ≤ νp (x) + 2. (4)
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the inequalities (4) (and they clearly hold for x = 0).
Suppose that there is a position such that νp(x) > ν̂p(x), i.e. Left does not want to win a tie at(
x , p̂
)
. By Lemma 16, we assume that Left bids 0. Then, if Right accepts the 0-tie, induction gives
a contradiction, namely
1 + νp (x − 1) < ν̂p (x − 1) − 1,
which is equivalent with
2 + νp (x − 1) < ν̂p(x − 1).
Suppose next that 2+νp (x) < ν̂p (x), which means that a tie-win is worth more than 2 points. Suppose
that Left bids 0. Then 2 + ν̂p (x − 1) − 1 < νp (x − 1) + 1, which contradicts the first inequality in
(4). 
The next lemma is a consequence of Marker Monocity.
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LEMMA 18. For all heap sizes x , all Left budgetsp and all Left bids 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ p, ν̂p (x) ≥ −ν̂q+ℓ(x).
PROOF. We have that, for all x , and all p,
ν̂ (x ,p) ≥ ν (x ,p) = −ν̂q(x) ≥ −ν̂q+ℓ(x),
by Lemma 17, because Lemma 14 gives ν̂q+ℓ(x) ≥ ν̂q(x). 
In the next Lemma 19, we show that unitary games (rules) satisfies U(C). That is, the marker is
never worth more than $1. This will complete our argument for the proof of the main Theorem 13
LEMMA 19 (MARKER WORTH, U(C)). Consider a unitary ruleset. Then, for all heap sizes x
and all Left budgets p,
ν̂p (x) ≤ νp+1(x)
PROOF. We prove this theorem by an induction argument on heaps of size x , and analyze the
values for all budget partitions. Consider the base case when x = 1. If Left can force a win with
budget p and the marker, then p ≥ q, and hence p+1 > q−1 gives that ν̂p(1) = 1 implies νp+1(1) = 1.
Therefore ν̂p (1) ≤ νp+1(1).
Suppose next that the theorem is true for all heap sizes smaller than x . To complete the induction,
we need to show that ν̂p (x) ≤ νp+1(x). We will prove the induction step for three different cases of
maximin ν̂p (x):
Case 1. Left wins with tie at
(
x , p̂
)
by bidding ℓ;
Case 2. Left wins without tie at
(
x , p̂
)
by bidding ℓ;
Case 3. Right wins at
(
x , p̂
)
by bidding r .
Consider Case 1. Right maximin weakly prefers losing an item at tie ℓ rather than winning it by
bidding ℓ + 1. Therefore,
− 1 + ν̂p+ℓ+1(x − 1) ≥ 1 + νp−ℓ(x − 1) (5)
There are two subcases.
The first subcase is whenever 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ q−1. We claim that Right does not maximin prefer winning
if Left bids ℓ + 1 at position (x ,p + 1). If Right wins at (x ,p + 1) by bidding ℓ + 1 with marker, then
−1 + ν̂p+ℓ+2(x − 1) ≥ −1 + ν̂p+ℓ+1(x − 1) ≥ 1 + νp−ℓ(x − 1)
The first inequality holds by heap monotonicity and the second follows from inequality (5).
Now assume that Right bids r > ℓ + 1 at (x ,p + 1), and wins. Then,
−1 + νp+r+1(x − 1) ≥ −1 + νp+ℓ+2(x − 1) ≥ −1 + ν̂p+ℓ+1(x − 1) ≥ 1 + νp−ℓ(x − 1)
The first inequality holds by heap monotonicity, the second by induction and the third follows from
inequality (5).
Altogether this implies that, for this subcase, νp+1(x) ≥ 1 + νp−ℓ(x − 1) = ν̂p (x).
Consider the other subcase, when ℓ ≥ q. In this case, Left can secure a win by bidding ℓ at
(x ,p + 1), as Right cannot over bid. This implies that
νp+1(x) ≥ 1 + νp−ℓ+1(x − 1) ≥ 1 + νp−ℓ(x − 1) = ν̂p (x)
(by heap monotonicity). This completes the proof for Case 1.
We now prove Case 2. Left wins the bid, without a tie, by bidding ℓ, and therefore, at
(
x , p̂
)
,
Right maximin weakly prefers losing the bid. We get
− 1 + ν̂p+ℓ+1(x − 1) ≥ 1 + ν̂p−ℓ(x − 1) = ν̂p (x) (6)
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Consider first the subcase, ℓ ≤ q−1. We claim that, if Left bids ℓ, then she maximin wins at position
(x ,p + 1). If not, then either Right maximin wins by bidding ℓ with a marker or by bidding r > ℓ.
Now, if Right bids ℓ and wins using a marker, we study the inequalities
−1 + ν̂p+ℓ+1(x − 1) ≥ 1 + ν̂p−ℓ(x − 1) ≥ 1 + νp−ℓ(x − 1)
The first inequality holds by (6) and the second inequality follows frommarker monotonicity. Hence,
at νp+1(x), Right would prefer losing if Left bids ℓ over winning by bidding ℓ with marker.
Now, if Right bids r > ℓ and maximin wins the bid, we study the inequalities
−1 + νp+r+1(x − 1) ≥ −1 + ν̂p+ℓ+1(x − 1)
≥ 1 + ν̂p−ℓ(x − 1)
≥ 1 + νp−ℓ(x − 1)
The first inequality holds by induction, the second follows from inequality (6), and the third follows
from marker monotonicity. Hence, at νp+1(x), Right would prefer losing if Left bids ℓ over winning
by bidding r > ℓ.
The subcase ℓ ≥ q is similar to Case 1. Altogether,
νp+1(x) ≥ 1 + νp−ℓ+1(x − 1) ≥ 1 + ν̂p−ℓ(x − 1) = ν̂p (x),
which completes the proof of Case 2.
We now prove Case 3. As Right maximin wins at
(
x , p̂
)
by bidding r , we get
ν̂p (x) = ν̂p+r (x − 1) − 1 ≤ νp−r+1(x − 1) + 1 (7)
In other words, at
(
x , p̂
)
, Right prefers winning, by bidding r , over losing for marker, by bidding
r − 1.
In order to prove this case, we claim that if Left bids ℓ = r − 1 at (x ,p + 1), then Right prefers
winning by a tie. This follows by the inequalities
1 + νp−r+2(x − 1) ≥ 1 + νp−r+1(x − 1) ≥ ν̂p+r (x − 1) − 1
The first inequality holds by budget monotonicity and the second follows from inequality (7).
Hence, playing from (x ,p + 1), Left can force at least the value where Right ties, i.e. νp+1(x) ≥
ν̂p+r (x − 1) − 1 = ν̂p (x). This completes the proof of Case 3.
Thus, the lemma holds. 
We have established the three properties of Definition 2. Therefore we conclude with the proof
of Theorem 13.
PROOF OF THEOREM 13. Combine Lemma 14with Lemma 18 and Lemma 19. Thus Definition 2
applies: unitary games are inU, and we may apply Corollary 6. 
From now onward we use outcome, i.e. o-notation, instead of ν̂ , and in proofs, we may fix the bid
of either player to prove inequalities as required by a given context. By fixing the bid of player Left
(Right), we may obtain a lower (upper) bound of the outcome, corresponding to maximin (minimax)
evaluation.
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3.3 A Sign Border and Bounded Game Values
In the last subsection, we have already shown that, for each position, unitary games exhibit a unique
equilibrium. Now, in this subsection, we discuss the bounds on game values for given TB, x and
budget partition. First, we establish the sign border of the game value for a given total budget of TB.
In Lemma 20, we show that if Left has more money than Right, i.e.p ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉ then the game value
op (x) ≥ 0. Moreover, we show that the sign of the outcome is sensitive to the sign border ⌈TB/2⌉
LEMMA 20 (SIGN BORDER). For a given TB and all heap sizes x , 2p ≥ TB implies op (x) ≥ 0,
and 2p < TB implies op (x) ≤ 0.
PROOF. We prove that, if p ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉ then op (x) ≥ 0. If p < ⌈TB/2⌉ then op (x) ≤ 0.
By the 0-sum property (1) combined with the first inequality in Lemma 17, we have op (x) ≥
−oq(x). Adding op (x) on both sides gives,
2op (x) ≥ op (x) − oq(x)
As p ≥ q, using heap monotonicity lemma, 2op (x) ≥ 0, which proves op (x) ≥ 0.
For the second part when p < TB/2, we use the second inequality in Lemma 17 combined with
the 0-sum property (1), we have op (x) ≤ −oq(x) + 2. Adding op (x) on both sides, we get
2op (x) ≤ op (x) − oq(x) + 2.
Hence,
op (x) ≤ (op (x) − oq(x))/2 + 1.
If x is even, this implies that op (x) ≤ 0, by heap monotonicity and Lemma 9; if x is odd then
op (x) ≤ 1.
Thus we may assume that, for some p < TB/2, op (x) = 1. If op−1(x − 1) = 0, then if Left wins by
bidding 1, Right increases to either get a tie by bidding 1 or to win by bidding 2. More precisely, if
oTB/2+2(x − 1) = 0 then he 1-ties, and otherwise, he bids 2. In either case this gives op (x) = −1.
If Left 0-ties at (x ,p) and o ⌈TB/2⌉(x − 1) = 0, then Right bids 1 and obtains op (x) ≤ −1, with
equality if p = ⌊TB/2⌋. 
OBSERVATION 21. Note that if the heap size x is odd, then, by Lemma 9, the inequalities in
Lemma 20 are strict.
The previous Lemma 20 is extensively useful to obtain an upper and lower bound on the game
value. In the next Lemma 22, by adapting Lemma 20, we prove an upper and a lower bound of the
game values.
LEMMA 22 (BOUNDED OUTCOME). For all x and all p, −⌊TB/2⌋ ≤ op (x) ≤ ⌈TB/2⌉ + 1.
PROOF. Consider first p ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉. We define a Right strategy, such that Left cannot get better
than ⌈TB/2⌉ + 1. Right bids 0 until (possibly) the first time Left’s budget partition becomes smaller
than ⌈TB/2⌉. In the case where Left has the marker and bids 0, the budget partition will stay the
same, but Right gets the marker. Hence, unless Left bids 1 in the next bid, the change in score would
be 1−1 = 0. When, at some point, Left bids 1, she keeps the marker, and gets a point, but the budget
partition is one unit closer to the sign border. Since the sign border is at ⌈TB/2⌉, the result follows,
by the similar bound for the case p < ⌈TB/2⌉. 
The following result in Proposition 23 proves the relation between change in the game value with
added extra one dollar to Left’s budget. We prove this result, even though we do not explicitly use it
in order to prove other results. We wonder how this result generalizes for arbitrary subtraction sets.
PROPOSITION 23. For all TB, for all x , for all p, op (x) + 2 ≥ op+1(x).
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PROOF. Assume for a contradiction that Left can obtain
op+1(x) = op (x) + 4 (8)
(or more), where the outcome at
(
x , p̂
)
is given. If Right wins at
(
x ,p + 1 ) , then he will decrease
bid, to possibly a tie. But Left prefers a smaller tie, so she can decrease and perhaps Right wins
again. If so, if the gain is only 2 points we are done, so assume gain is 4 points. Then he decreased
again and Left still prefers smaller tie, and so on.
By Theorem 3 we do not need to consider cases where Left wins. Hence those cases where Right
wins at
(
x ,p + 1 ) reduce to study of cases where Left wins by a 0-tie at position (x ,p + 1 ) and with
(8). Thus, only two cases remain.
(1) Left wins an ℓ-tie at
(
x , p̂
)
, and she wins a 0-tie at
(
x ,p + 1 ) .
(2) Right wins at
(
x , p̂
)
by bidding r , and Left wins a 0-tie at
(
x ,p + 1 ) .
For Case 1, we have op (x) = −oq+ℓ(x − 1) + 1 and op+1(x) = −oq−1(x − 1) + 1, and hence, by (8)
4 − oq+ℓ(x − 1) = −oq−1(x − 1) (9)
Thus, by induction, ℓ > 0. This means that Left must avoid a Right win with 1 ≤ r = ℓ − 1 at(
x ,p + 1 ) . Hence op+r (x − 1) < −oq+ℓ(x − 1) + 1 = −oq−1(x − 1) − 3 ≤ op+1(x − 1) − 3, by (9) and
marker monotonicity.
For Case 2, we have op (x) = op+r (x − 1) − 1 and op+1(x) = −oq−1(x − 1) + 1, and hence
4 + op+r (x − 1) − 1 = −oq−1(x − 1) + 1, (10)
That is, op+r (x − 1) + oq−1(x − 1) = −2. If q − 1 is to the left of the sign border, then op+r (x − 1) −
op+1(x − 1) ≤ −2, which is impossible, by budget monotonicity and since r ≥ 1. If q − 1 is to the
right of the sign border, then p + r is to the left, and we get oq−1(x − 1) − oq−r (x − 1) ≤ −2, which is
impossible, by r ≥ 1 and budget monotonicity. 
Next, in Lemma 24 we prove that the equilibrium outcomes are monotone (non-decreasing or non-
increasing as reflected by the sign border) for heap sizes of the same parity. We show that whenever
2p ≥ TB, then the game value increases as heap size increases and similarly, for 2p < TB, game
value is monotonically decreasing. We note that budget monotonicity does not imply this result as
we do not change the parity but heap size.
LEMMA 24 (HEAP MONOTONICITY). Fix a total budget TB and a Left budget p̂, and consider
unitary games with heap sizes of the same parity. If 2p ≥ TB, then the value is monotonically
non-decreasing, and otherwise it is monotonically non-increasing. This is impossible, by budget
monotonicity, since r ≥ 1.
PROOF. The base case concerns heap sizes x = 0 and 2. Since the outcomes are all 0 at x = 0,
this case is covered by Lemma 20 (Sign Border).
We study the outcome at heap size x . The value op (x − 2) satisfies (at least) one out of three
definitions:
L: op (x − 2) = op−ℓ(x − 3) + 1.
5
R: op (x − 2) = op+r (x − 3) − 1.
T: op (x − 2) = −oq+ℓ(x − 3) + 1.
5Note that by the proof of Theorem 3, it is not required to study the cases where Lefts wins a bid strictly. However, for the
flow of the proof we find it somewhat nicer when those cases are included.
Urban Larsson, Neel Patel, and Ravi Kant Rai 15
In case L, Left wins the bid; in case R, Right wins the bid, and in case T, there is a tie, so Left, who
has the marker, wins the bid.
The proof splits into 10 distinct cases, depending on how the bid is won,
(1) Tie and 2p ≥ TB,q + ℓ < ⌈TB/2⌉
(2) Tie and 2p < TB,q + ℓ ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉
(3) Right wins and 2p ≥ TB, 2(p + r ) ≥ TB
(4) Left wins and 2p ≥ TB, 2(p − ℓ) ≥ TB
(5) Left wins and 2p < TB, 2(p − ℓ) < TB
(6) Right wins and 2p < TB, 2(p + r ) < TB
A. Left wins and 2p ≥ TB, 2(p − ℓ) < TB
B. Right wins and 2p < TB, 2(p + r ) ≥ TB
C. Tie and 2p ≥ TB,q + ℓ ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉
D. Tie and 2p < TB,q + ℓ < ⌈TB/2⌉
The case (D) cannot happen, because q ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉ and ℓ ≥ 0.
In cases 1-6 and several subcases we use induction. Suppose for example that 2p ≥ TB, and we
wish to prove, by induction, that for all x > 1,
op (x) ≥ op (x − 2). (11)
Hence, we show that Right cannot do better in (x ,p) than in (x − 2,p). As induction hypothesis, we
may assume op+r (x − 1) ≥ op+r (x − 3), and hence, if Right wins at x by bidding r , then inequality
(11) holds. We will refer to similar situations by saying ‘by induction’. For some more detail, to
contradict the inequality (11), Right must change strategy at x . That is he must lower his bid to r − 1
or smaller. If he lowers to r − 1, then we may assume that this is now a tie, and this situation has to
be considered. In case the decrease of bid is successful for Right, then Left might deviate, etc; the
particular context will determine.
In cases of tie, the argument will be by induction in cases where the relevant budget partition
crosses the Sign Border. For example in case (1), Left wins, and TB − p + ℓ < TB/2. Since
2p ≥ TB, we wish to prove a non-decreasing outcome, and induction thus applies when signs
for non-decreasing outcomes change. Note that in case of tie bids, the player who tries to contradict
the inequality, could do this either by lowering, or raising the bid, and thus several sub-cases may
need to be considered. Since there are significant variations to why the contradicting player will not
succeed, we will treat all cases.
Case 1. The players ℓ-tie at heap size x − 2 and where 2p ≥ TB. We have
op (x − 2) = −oq+ℓ(x − 3) + 1, (12)
where q + ℓ < ⌈TB/2⌉, i.e. 2(p − ℓ) > TB. We need to prove that
op (x) ≥ op (x − 2). (13)
We use induction to assume that
−oq+ℓ(x − 1) ≥ −oq+ℓ(x − 3) (14)
By way of contradiction, (14) and (13), Right deviates at x :
(1) If Right decreases his bid, Left wins by bidding ℓ. Hence, by p − ℓ ≥ TB/2, induction gives
op (x)|L(ℓ) = 1 + op−ℓ(x − 1) ≥ 1 + op−ℓ(x − 3). By Lemma 16, Tie Monotonicity, op−ℓ(x − 3) ≥
−oq+ℓ(x − 3) and 1 − oq+ℓ(x − 3) = op (x − 2). Thus, op (x)|L(ℓ) ≥ op (x − 2).
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(2) If Right increases his bid, he wins and we get op (x)|R(r ) = op+r (x − 1) − 1, with r = ℓ + 1. As
Right does not benefit by increasing his bid at ‘x − 3’, he cannot benefit by increasing his bid at
‘x − 1’. This follows by induction, because, by assumption (12), op (x − 2) ≤ op+r (x − 3) − 1 ≤
op+r (x − 1) − 1 = op (x)|R(r ).
Case 2. The players ℓ-tie at heap size x − 2 and where 2p < TB. We have
op (x − 2) = −oq+ℓ(x − 3) + 1, (15)
where q + ℓ ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉, i.e. 2(p − ℓ) ≤ TB. We need to prove that
op (x) ≤ op (x − 2). (16)
We use induction to assume that
−oq+ℓ(x − 1) ≤ −oq+ℓ(x − 3) (17)
By way of contradiction of (16), Left deviates at x .
(1) If Left decreases her bid, Right wins by bidding ℓ. Hence, op (x)|R(l ) = op+ℓ(x − 1) − 1. If
2(p + ℓ) < TB, by induction, Left cannot contradict (16). Since the relative loss for Left is 2,
when Right wins the bid, by heap monotonicity, Left requires a relative 4-gap in outcomes at
‘x − 3’ and ‘x − 1’, with 2(p + ℓ) ≥ TB. That is, Left requires
−oq+ℓ(x − 3) + 4 ≤ op+ℓ(x − 1) (18)
By the assumption 2p < TB, we get p+ℓ < q+ℓ. Therefore, by heap monotonicity,oq+ℓ(x−3) ≥
2. Moreover, if oq+ℓ(x − 3) = 2, by heap monotonicity and (18), this forces 0 = op+ℓ(x − 3) <
op+ℓ(x − 1) = 2. We will refer to this situation as the 4-gap principle.
Hence, Right can decrease the bid to ℓ − 1, and still satisfy oq+ℓ−1(x − 3) = 2, and the argument
can be repeated with ℓ − 1 instead of ℓ, until at some point op+ℓ′(x − 1) = 0; this must happen
for some ℓ′ ≥ 0, by 2p < TB and Sign Border. The case oq+ℓ(x − 3) ≥ 4 need not be considered,
since 2(p + ℓ) ≥ TB and the Sign Border implies that Left should have decreased the bid to ℓ − 1
at ‘x − 3’ (she would have been strictly better off losing the bid and if Right decreases then by
Tie Monotonicity, she benefits by a smaller tie).
(2) If Left increases her bid, by induction, she cannot increase the outcome. Namely, op (x)|L(ℓ+1) =
op−ℓ−1(x − 1) + 1 ≤ op−ℓ−1(x − 3) + 1 ≤ oq+ℓ(x − 3) + 1, by assumption.
Case 3. Right wins at heap size x − 2, by bidding r , and where 2p ≥ TB. Then 2(p + r ) > TB. We
have op (x − 2) = op+r (x − 3) − 1, and need to prove that
op (x) ≥ op (x − 2). (19)
If Right keeps the same winning bid, by induction, he cannot contradict this inequality. Hence he
decreases the bid to r − 1 at x . We may assume this is a tie, so the relative loss for Right is 2 points.
By induction, we may assume that q + r − 1 ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉, and that
−oq+r−1(x − 1) < −oq+r−1(x − 3) (20)
Suppose first that op+r (x −3)−1 = op (x −2) = 0. Then (20) forces q+r −1 > p+r . This contradicts
the assumption 2p ≥ TB.
Suppose next that op+r (x − 3) − 1 = op (x − 2) = 1. Then
2 = op+r (x − 3) ≤ op+r (x − 1), (21)
by induction.
Claim: p + r > q + r − 1. Proof of Claim: If p + r ≤ q + r − 1, then, by (21), heap monotonicity
and the 4-gap principle, Right instead prefers to tie at ‘x − 3’.
Therefore, by (20), (21) and heap monotonicity, we get 2 = op+r−1(x − 1) > op+r−1(x − 3) = 0.
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But then, Left will decrease her bid at x , below r − 1, and Right will win. However, the argument
gives the same outcome as when he wins by bidding r . Thus, we may repeat the argument, and
Right cannot contradict (19).
Case 4. Left wins by bidding ℓ > 0, 2p ≥ TB and 2(p − ℓ) ≥ TB. Thus, op (x − 2) = op−ℓ(x − 3) + 1.
We need to prove that
op (x) ≥ op (x − 2). (22)
If Right keeps the same bid at x , by induction, he cannot contradict this inequality. If he can increase
the bid to ℓ at x , there is a tie (otherwise we are done). If the tie remains to the left of the Sign Border,
and there is an increase of outcome, i.e. 2(q + ℓ) ≥ TB and oq+ℓ(x − 1) > oq+ℓ(x − 3), then he will
gain the sufficient amount to contradict (19). But by the third assumption, this can only happen if
2(p − ℓ) = TB. Hence TB is even. Hence, 2 = oq+ℓ(x − 1) > oq+ℓ(x − 3) = 0, which would give
outcome -1 at x instead of +1. But, since the bids q + ℓ = p − ℓ, Left can deviate and let Right win
the bid, to produce an outcome at least +1, since p + ℓ > p − ℓ.
Case 5. Left wins by bidding ℓ > 0 and 2p < TB. We have op (x − 2) = op−ℓ(x − 3) + 1. We need to
prove that
op (x) ≤ op (x − 2). (23)
By induction,
op−ℓ(x − 1) ≤ op−ℓ(x − 3).
Therefore, to contradict (23), Left must change her bid, and she can decrease to ‘ℓ − 1’, to get a tie.
But,
op (x)|T (ℓ−1) = −oq+ℓ−1(x − 1) + 1 ≤ −oq+ℓ−1(x − 3) + 1 (24)
≤ op−ℓ(x − 3) + 1 = op (x − 2), (25)
since p < ⌈TB/2⌉ implies that q + ℓ − 1 ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉. If she tries to decrease further, to make
Right win the bid to gain a higher outcome, then Right can respond by decreasing his bid, and the
sequence of inequalities still holds.
Case 6. Right wins by bidding r and 2(p + r ) < TB. That is, op (x − 2) = op+r (x − 3) − 1 < 0. We
need to prove that
op (x) ≤ op (x − 2). (26)
And assume, by induction,
op+r (x − 1) ≤ op+r (x − 3).
Hence Left must change bid, to contradict (26). If Left can increase her bid to ‘r ’ at ‘x’, we get
op (x)|T (r ) = −oq+r (x − 1) + 1 ≤ −oq+r (x − 3) + 1
≤ op+r (x − 3) − 1 = op (x − 2),
since p < ⌈TB/2⌉ implies that q+r ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉. If she can increase her bid to ‘r +1’, since 2p < TB,
right can also raise his bid to r + 1, and the sequence of inequalities still holds.
Case A. Left wins, by bidding ℓ, 2p ≥ TB and 2(p − ℓ) < TB. We have
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op (x − 2) = op−ℓ(x − 3) + 1, (27)
and we must prove that
op (x) ≥ op (x − 2). (28)
By induction,
op−ℓ(x − 1) ≤ op−ℓ(x − 3). (29)
If the inequality is strict, then −2 ≥ op−ℓ(x − 1), and Left must change her bid. Suppose she
decreases her bid to a ‘0’ tie. Then
op (x)|T (0) = −oq(x − 1) + 1 ≥ 1,
by the assumption p ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉, which suffices to justify (27). If Right instead wins by bidding
1, then this only contradicts (28) if op+1(x − 1) = 0. In this case Left can raise the bid to get a
1-tie, and indeed, oq+1(x − 1) ≤ op+1(x − 1) = 0, by heap monotonicity, since q ≤ p; this implies
−oq+1(x − 1) ≥ 0. This argument can be repeated (Right instead wins by bidding 2 and perhaps Left
raises to a 2-tie etc.) until one of the assumptions fails to hold.
Case B. Right wins, by bidding r , 2p < TB and 2(p + r ) ≥ TB. Thus,
op (x − 2) = −op+r (x − 3) − 1 ≤ −1, (30)
and we need to prove that
op (x) ≤ op (x − 2). (31)
By induction,
op+r (x − 1) ≥ op+r (x − 3) (32)
If this is a strict inequality, then Right must change his bid to satisfy (31). He decreases to r − 1, and
gets a tie:
op (x)|T (r−1) = −oq+r−1(x − 1) + 1
Note that q + r − 1 ≥ p + r . Therefore, by assumption of strict inequality in (31), Right obtains the
desired 4-gap, which implies that the inequality (31) holds. Thus
Left could decrease, and let Right win by r − 1, but this could only help him, and we could either
repeat the argument, or go to Case 6. Suppose that Left can increase to win by bidding r . But Right
can ‘r ’-tie, and this is weakly better for him than the assumed ‘r − 1’ tie.
Case C. Tie, 2p ≥ TB and q + ℓ ≥ ⌈TB/2⌉. We have
op (x − 2) = −oq+ℓ(x − 3) + 1, (33)
We need to prove that
op (x) ≥ op (x − 2). (34)
We use induction to assume that
−oq+ℓ(x − 1) ≤ −oq+ℓ(x − 3) (35)
If the inequality is strict, then Left must change her bid. If she decreases so Right wins by bidding
ℓ, then
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op (x)|R(ℓ) = op+ℓ(x − 1) − 1. (36)
By the assumption of strict inequality, together with Lemma 18, we get 2 ≤ oq+ℓ(x − 1) ≤
op+ℓ(x − 1), which gives the desired 4-gap. Then, if Right decreases, Lemma 16 gives that Left
cannot be worse of by tie ‘ℓ − 1’. The argument can be repeated, or we are in Case 1.
If the inequality (35) is not strict, then Right must change his bid to contradict (34). Induction
shows that he cannot benefit by increasing his bid. Suppose he decreases so Left wins by bidding ℓ.
By Lemma 18, op−ℓ(x − 1) ≥ −oq+ℓ(x − 1), which does not worsen Left’s result. 
We are now ready to prove the second main theorem of the paper. In Theorem 25, we show that
the game value of a given budget partition is constant for large heapsizes. The proof of the Theorem
follows from Lemma 22 and Lemma 24.
THEOREM 25 (EVENTUAL PERIOD 2 OF EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES). The game value of a
given budget partition is constant, for all sufficiently large heaps of the same parity.
PROOF. Fix any parity for the heap sizes. By Lemma 24, the game values are column-wise non-
decreasing weakly to the left of TB/2, and non-increasing to the right of TB/2. Therefore, since, for
each column, by Lemma 22 their absolute values are bounded, they converge to a finite constant. 
3.4 A Bidding Automaton and a Quadratic Bound
In this subsection, we analyze the convergence of the game value for unitary games. We will deter-
mine a quadratic bound in the total budget TB for the demonstrated game value ‘convergence’. We
will do this via explicit bounds of the outcome vector.
We make use of functions defined on the even and odd integers, that later will represent the
possible budget partitions for even and odd total budgets, respectively. See Lemma 26 below. Define
nearest integer functions αeven and αodd (the indexes will correspond to the parities of the heap sizes)
on the even integers (for TB even inputs will correspond to p − q = 2p − TB), by
αeven(δ ) =

⌊
δ+1
2
⌋
, if δ ≡ 0 (mod 4);
⌈
δ+1
2
⌉
, otherwise.
αodd(δ ) =

⌈
δ+1
2
⌉
, if δ ≡ 0 (mod 4);
⌊
δ+1
2
⌋
, otherwise.
Let ι : Z→ {0, 1} be the function ι(x) = 1 if and only if x > 0. Define a nearest integer function,
β on the odd integers (for TB odd inputs will correspond to p − q = 2p − TB), by
β(δ ) =

⌊
δ
2
⌋
+ ι(δ ), if δ ≡ 1 (mod 4).
⌈
δ
2
⌉
+ ι(δ ), otherwise.
For any fixed (budget) TB ∈ N0, we define an automaton A with TB + 1 nodes and 2 states per
node, such that, for all states j ∈ {even, odd}, for all nodes p ∈ {0, . . . ,TB}
(j,p)
A
−→ (jc ,q),
with updates, for all j,p,
A(j,p) = 1 − A(jc ,q),
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where jc is the complement of j, and where initial values are assigned to say all even states. Note
that, by definition, independently of initial values, the even states are reflexive, and so are the odd
ones. In Lemma 26, we show that the α and β functions are automaton A duals in the following
sense.
LEMMA 26. For allp, letA(even,p) = αeven(2p−TB). Then, for allp,A(odd,p) = αodd(2p−TB).
For all p, let A(even,p) = β(2p − TB). Then, for all p,A(odd,p) = β(2p − TB).
PROOF. In case of even TB, we want to justify that αeven(2p − TB) = 1 − αodd(TB − 2p), which
holds since, for all δ , ⌈ δ+1
2
⌉ + ⌊ −δ+1
2
⌋ = 1. Namely, if δ is odd, then we cancel the nearest integer
functions and the equality holds; if δ = 2m is even, then we getm + ⌈1/2⌉ −m + ⌊1/2⌋ = 1.
In case of odd TB, we want to justify that β(2p − TB) = 1 − β(TB − 2p). Suppose first that
p > TB/2. Then β(2p−TB)+ β(TB− 2p) = ⌊δ/2⌋ + 1+ ⌈−δ/2⌉ or ⌈δ/2⌉ + 1+ ⌊−δ/2⌋; in either case
these expressions equal one. Because TB is odd, the other case is i < TB/2, and so the argument is
analogous. 
A (generic) TB-bidding automaton is a finite state machine with ‘TB + 1’ states, directed edges
between the states, and an update rule for each directed edge. Each state has an outgoing edge
corresponding to a feasible winning bid from one of the players. Clearly, for any TB, A is a bid-
ding automaton where the winning bid is 0, i.e. Left wins a 0-tie. We improve on Theorem 25, by
describing an explicit bound, and begin with a lemma.
LEMMA 27. For any given total budget TB, and any Left budget p̂, the entries of automatonA
bound the outcome op (·). If p ≥ TB/2, then op (x) ≤ A(j,p), where the parity of x is j, and otherwise
op (x) ≥ A(j,p).
PROOF. We prove, by induction that the values as prescribed by automaton A cannot be ex-
ceeded.
Consider first even TB. In this case we are concerned with the α functions. For odd heap sizes x ,
and 2p ≥ TB, we show that
(1) op+r (x) − 1 ≥ αeven(2p − TB), r > 0,
(2) op−ℓ(x) + 1 ≤ αeven(2p − TB), ℓ > 0, and
(3) −oq+ℓ(x) + 1 ≤ αeven(2p − TB), ℓ ≥ 0.
That is, by induction, we show,
(1) αodd(2(p + r ) − TB) − 1 ≥ αeven(2p − TB), r > 0,
(2) αodd(2(p − ℓ) − TB) + 1 ≤ αeven(2p − TB), ℓ > 0, and
(3) −αodd(2(q + ℓ)) − TB) + 1 ≤ αeven(2p − TB).
Note that Case 3 has already been justified for ℓ = 0 in Lemma 26, and when ℓ > 0 obviously the
inequality still holds.
For Case 2, the tightest situation is when ℓ = 1 i.e. when 2(p − 1) − TB ≡ 2 (mod 4), i.e. if
the outcome equals
⌊
2(p−1)−TB+1
2
⌋
+ 1 and we see that it equals
⌊
2p−TB+1
2
⌋
, i.e., this is the case
when 2p − TB ≡ 0 (mod 4) and 2(p − 1) − TB ≡ 2 (mod 4). If ℓ = 2 then the outcome equals⌈
2(p−2)−TB+1
2
⌉
+ 1 =
⌈
2p−TB+1
2
⌉
− 1 ≤
⌊
2p−TB+1
2
⌋
. If ℓ > 2 the inequality is immediate.
The remaining case for even TB and the cases for odd TB are justified analogously. 
We say that a game converges at heap size x if, for all p, then op (x) = op (x + 2), but there is a p
such that op (x) , op (x − 2). Observe that convergence at x implies that op (x + 1) = op (x + 3), for all
p. We say that a game converges if it converges at some x < ∞.
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THEOREM 28 (CONVERGENCE BOUND). The upper bound for convergence is the sum of the
entries in the 0-bidding automaton, and it is of order of magnitudeO(TB2).
PROOF. We use the bounds of the outcomes for each budget partition as prescribed by the 0-
bidding automaton A. By Lemma 27 if the game did not converge before the entries of A have
been reached, it converges at the first occurrence of the A entries. We use Theorem 30 to see that
(nearly) half the entires change by going from heap size 0 to heap size 2.
Thus, for an even total budget TB, we bound the maximal number of rounds induced by the
0-bidding automatonA, as
1 +
∑
δ ∈{0,2, ...,TB}
(
δ + 1
2
+
δ + 1
2
)
− TB = 1 + (TB/2 + 1)TB/2 − TB/2 = O(TB2),
and a similar convergence bound holds for the odd sized total budgets,
1 + TB/2 +
∑
δ ∈{1,3, ...,TB}
(
δ
2
+
δ
2
)
− TB = 1 + ⌈TB/2⌉2 − TB/2 = O(TB2),

If the upper bounds are obtained, then this proves that the equilibrium bids are zero-ties. Namely,
the edges of the automaton A correspond to 0-bids. (There may be other optimal bids as well, but
we do not classify those here.) In the next section, we illustrate some feasible bids for automaton
A.
CONJECTURE 29 (AUTOMATON GAME CORRESPONDENCE). Consider any unitary game. The
entries of the corresponding automaton A are obtained as outcomes, for all heaps of size at least
O(TB2).
3.5 The Number of Forced Wins
As an independent result, we count the number of forced wins a player with a larger budget can
have.
THEOREM 30 (BUDGET ADVANTAGE). Consider any game (TB; x ,p,m; c), with TB = p + q.
Suppose that Left has the marker. Then Left can force a win of the x final moves if p ≥ (2x − 1)q +
2x−1 − 1. If Right has the marker, then Left can force a win of the x final moves if p ≥ (2x − 1)(q+ 1).
PROOF. We take the case when we have the configuration of the game as game (TB; x ,p, 1; c),
where p + q = TB and p ≥ q. To win the first move Left should at least bid q dollars, i.e. p ≥ q.
So, Right has now at least 2q dollars and so Left to win the second round he must bid 2q + 1
dollars. He must have q + (2q + 1) = 3q + 1 dollars to win 2 consecutive moves. Right has now
at least 4q + 1 dollars. Left must bid 4q + 2 dollars to win the third consecutive round and in total
he must have at least q + (2q + 1) + (4q + 2) = 7q + 3 dollars. Similarly, he should bid 8q + 4
and 16q + 8 dollars to win the fourth and fifth consecutive moves. In total, he must have at least
q + (2q + 1) + (4q + 2) + (8q + 4) + (16q + 8) = 31q + 15 dollars to win 5 consecutive moves.
We prove this by induction. We take the base case of x = 1 move and we get p ≥ q which is true
since if the budget is equal, Left wins by the marker. We assume it to be true for x = k moves and
prove it for x = k + 1 moves.
To win x = k consecutive moves, Left’s budget should be at least (2k − 1)q + 2k−1 − 1. To win
(k + 1)st move, Left should bid at least ‘1’ more than that of Right budget after k move which is
(2k −1)q+2k−1−1+q, which is equal to 2kq+2k−1−1. Hence Left must bid 2kq+2k−1. Hence total
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budget which must be available with Left after k + 1 move is {(2k − 1)q + 2k−1 − 1} + {2kq + 2k−1}
= 2 = (2k+1 − 1)q + 2k − 1. Hence induction holds.
When we have the configuration of the game (TB; x ,p, 0; c), Left should at least bid q + 1 dollars.
Right now has 2q + 1 dollars. So, Left must have at least (q + 1)+ (2q + 2) = 3q + 3 dollars to win 2
consecutive moves. Right now has 4q + 3 dollars for the third round and so Left must have at least
(q + 1) + (2q + 2) + (4q + 4) = 7q + 7 dollars to win 3 consecutive moves.
We prove this by induction. We take the base case of x = 1 move and we get p ≥ q + 1 which is
true since if budgets are equal, Left wins by bidding ‘1’ more than that of the bid of Right, which
can be at most q. We assume it to be true for x = k moves and prove it for x = k + 1 moves.
To win x = k consecutive moves, Left’s budget should be at least (2k − 1)(q + 1). To win (k + 1)st
move, Left should bid at least ‘1’ more than that of Right budget after k move which is (2k − 1)(q +
1)+q, which is equal to 2k (q+1)−1. Hence Left must bid 2k (q+1). Hence total budget which must
be available with Left after k + 1 move is {2k (q + 1)} + {(2k − 1)(q + 1)} = (2k+1 − 1)(q + 1). Hence
induction holds. 
4 DISCUSSION
Note that one can deduce neat formulas for the upper bounds for the convergence of the outcomes,
by using the explicit bounds of outcome values as prescribed by the α and β functions. The re-
maining question is if this worst possible convergence bound is tight. We believe so, because of the
elegance of the 0-bidding automaton A. But currently, we do not have an argument to show that
earlier convergence could not happen, for some large total budget. There are other open questions:
1) Prove or disprove periodicity of outcomes for any TB, but with an arbitrary finite subtraction
set. Our methods indicate that if we restrict the allowed bids of the two players, then we still have
convergence, but how do restricted bidding sets affect the strategies? In particular, what happens
if 0-bids are not allowed? Classify asymmetric (partizan) bidding sets according to (asymptotic)
player strength.
On another note, an interesting paper on ‘general sum’ Richman games has recently appeared
[15]. They show budget monotonicity for games on binary trees, but find a counterexample if a
node may have three children (a threat provokes a situation where a player prefers a smaller budget).
Our setting readily generalizes to general sum, or more specifically to so-called self interest games,
by instead of the zero-sum definition, letting both players maximize their individual final scores. The
discrete Richman bidding scheme would stay the same, and one would need to expand on various
questions of monotonicity, and for example existence of a unique PSPE and Pareto efficiency.
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5 ILLUSTRATION OF FEASIBLE, DOMINATED AND RELEVANT BIDS
Consider (symmetric) BCS. We illustrate the feasible bids for total budget 5, including a short
discussion of dominated bids. Such bids are also feasible arrows for automaton A. In Figure 3,
we show the possible tie bids (and here domination is never an issue). In Figure 4, we show the
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possible Left winning bids, and in Figure 5, we show the same bids, but without dominated bids.
Note that whenever propertyU holds, then Left winning bids may be ignored, in optimal play. In
Figure 6, we illustrate the corresponding situations for Right winning bids, and here the pictures
(where dominated bids have been erased) are relevant. By relevant, we mean that, in general, one
cannot exclude the possibility that a bid may be a unique equilibrium (in some specific setting).
012345
0T
0T
0T
012345
1T
1T
012345
2T
2T
Fig. 3. The pictures represent Left’s wins via tie bids, for TB = 5; Left has the marker together with
the indicated number of dollars. Note that only in the case of both players bidding “0” all nodes have
outgoing edges. In either case, they are all negative, indicated with the color blue in the picture. For
example, if Left has $4, and wins by bidding 0, then the next state is that Right gets the marker and
$1. Of course none of the bids are dominated in the case of a win by using the marker. Dominated
bids only appear because the other player does not have enough budget to motivate such a bid.
Compare this situation with Figures 4 and 5
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012345
1W 1W 1W 1W 1W
012345
2W 2W 2W 2W
012345
3W 3W 3W
012345
4W 4W
012345
5W
Fig. 4. Non-reduced bidding, for TB = 5, where a right (left) pointing edge indicates that Left (Right)
wins the bidding. As before the default is that Left has the marker together with the indicated number
of dollars. Note the increasing number of nodes without outgoing edges.
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012345
1W 1W 1W 1W 1W
012345
2W 2W 2W
012345
3W
Fig. 5. The remaining Left winning bids from Figure 4 when dominated bids have been erased, for
TB = 5. These bids are not relevant whenever propertyU is satisfied.
012345
1W 1W 1W 1W 1W
012345
2W 2W 2W
012345
3W
Fig. 6. The remaining Right winning bids from Figure 4 when dominated bids have been erased, for
TB = 5. These bids are relevant, even when propertyU holds.
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